Citing a report prepared for the Defense Department by the Defense Science Board, the Washington Post published an article today highlighting attacks from Chinese cyber-spies that compromised US Weapons systems designs. The Post noted that the attacks exposed “programs critical to U.S. missile defenses and combat aircraft and ships.” The article specifically noted that “the advanced Patriot missile system, known as PAC-3; an Army system for shooting down ballistic missiles, known as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD; and the Navy’s Aegis ballistic-missile defense system” were compromised, as well as “vital combat aircraft and ships, including the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship”.
The Post’s article does not specifically cover how the designs were stolen, what methods were used to attack networks, and whether these were attacks aimed at US Government networks or defense contractors, although anonymous U.S. officials cited in the article “said senior U.S. defense and diplomatic officials presented the Chinese with case studies detailing the evidence of major intrusions into U.S. companies, including defense contractors.” The article also noted that a recent National Intelligence Estimate noted that “that China was by far the most active country in stealing intellectual property from U.S. companies”. This comes on top of Mandiant’s Intelligence Center Report earlier this year detailing the activities of APT1, a China based cyber-espionage group believed to be a unit in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
While the Cyber-warfare term has been hyped quite extensively and sometimes disingenuously within the information security community, these reports highlight that there are certain cyber threat actors today that are actively engaged in target specific attacks to gain information from networks. Without full details of how the attacks were executed, one can only speculate that the attackers discovered exploitable vulnerabilities within the network to gain access to and ultimately extract this data. It is yet further evidence that a reactive information security stance ultimately will not protect an organization from a dedicated attacker. To truly secure our networks, we as security practitioners must proactively identify the vulnerable system(s) on our network that could lead to a breach before the attackers do, and prioritize our remediation efforts around the systems the pose the greatest risk to attack. Furthermore, to ensure ongoing security, security practitioners must be able to know in advance if proposed network or security changes will introduce or expose systems to further risk or breach from attackers and remediate these exposures before the change is committed. We have discussed this topic many times here on the FireMon blog, and pointed out that the technology to enable a Risk-based security posture is already available. While many Federal officials have called for an expedited adoption rate around a proactive risk policy, articles like the one today in the Washington Post show that those calls are not being heeded fast enough.